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Most Eastern European countries are currently engaged in some form of anti-corruption training. Such training can consist of teaching anti-corruption police to “kick in doors” responsibly, auditors to find the loopy trail to the dirty cash, the concerned mother to denounce bribe-seeking in the medical officials who provide care for her children -- and the list goes on.​[2]​ Given the wide range of anti-corruption training programmes (and the even wider range of corrupt activities springing up in the post-Socialist economic environments), co-ordination of these training programmes is a priority. To address this concern, the members of the Working Group on Preventing Corruption met at the 11th Annual NISPAcee conference on April 10-12.​[3]​ Members came from Albania, Czech Republic, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine. 

A Clean Education 

Anti-corruption training – and more generally the development of human capital and “capacity” within the public sector – have been seen as key elements for the success of failure of anti-corruption policy (Schacter and Shah, 2001). The impetus for such training usually occurs, not due to government benevolence, but as a result of stakeholder pressure. Much of this pressure emerges as a result of action-oriented data which can be used for benchmarking and policy advocacy (UNDCP, 2001; Rischard, 2002). For example, the quantitative data shown in Figure 1 highlight the wide variation between the level and focus of anti-corruption training in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region.​[4]​ However, unlike data on rainfall for example, the medium is the message. The public availability of benchmarks and evaluations acts to motivate better figures and most importantly, real training of judges, police, auditors, civil servants and the people who can contribute to fighting corruption. The data in Figure 1 do not show actual levels of anti-corruption training in the CEE region – it shows something far more important. These data show the known or perceived levels of anti-corruption training which determine public opinion and “peer pressure” within and between countries. 

Often qualitative data is much more valid (and interesting). Based on the available evidence, some countries appear to still be defining corruption while others have complicated national anti-corruption programmes bolstered by education. Such differences are usually a reflection of the country’s EU accession process. Other differences do not reflect EU accession, such as the institutionally and culturally differing focus on general versus technical anti-corruption training. While much of the anti-corruption activity within the CEE region is still focused on legislation, there is little consideration of how training and education can help with the implementation of this legislation. Instead of anti-corruption training being driving by strategic priorities, it appears to be driven by the availability of donor funding for specific types of training. How can anti-corruption training move from being funding-based to being priority-based?  
What a Tangled Web We Weave  

The National Anti-Corruption Training Programme (NACTP) refers to the ensemble of training activities and their linkages. Much international experience suggests that institutions work together in a web of activities to form “integrity systems” (Langseth et al., 1998; Transparency International, 2003). These institutions form a system whether explicit acknowledgement of their inter-linkage is given or not – and some systems work better than others.​[5]​ Table I shows some of the activities and sectors of the NACTP along with the number of countries in the region engaged in acting in any particular activity or sector.​[6]​ In some cases, activity selection reflects strategic priorities while in other cases, it reflects chance and funding. Thinking of anti-corruption training as a system allows all stakeholders to think about anti-corruption purposively, as a system. NACTPs also help provide standard framework for evaluation and assessment.

Just Another Brick in the Wall? 














Quality assessment	?	Yes	?	High	Yes 	Yes ?	?	Yes ?
University role	High	High	Medium	High	High?		?	Medium
Note: This table represents a subjective and “inductive” assessment of countries based on a clustering of strategic priorities done by the authors based on available information. These rankings do not reflect statements by policymakers or officials. 
* The Polish report focuses heavily on the University sector making the assessment of the non-university sector difficult. 
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^1	  The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the opinions of the authors’ organisations, the Working Group referred to in the text, nor to the NISPA. 
^2	  For more on corruption and anti-corruption in the region, see Miller (2001), Octopus Programme (2001), or the operational documents of donors working in the field such as Council of Europe (2003). 
^3	  NISPAcee stands for National Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe. 
^4	  These are composite scores based on a standardised evaluation methodology used to assess the level and nature of CEE anti-corruption training. If a country had a activity or was involved in a particular sector, it received a point. Points were aggregated to arrive at these composite scores. For more, see Michael (2003). 
^5	  Detractors would claim that viewing anti-corruption in this way repeats the famous “functionalist fallacy” (everything in the world does not have to be linked to everything else). Given the empirical evidence from Transparency International (2002) and Kaufmann et al. (1999), there are compelling reasons to think these institutions do act together. 
^6	  For more on the evaluation of anti-corruption programmes, see Haarhuis and Leeuw (2000), Huther and Shah. (2000).
^7	  This section relies heavily on data gathered as part of a grounded theory exercise conducted at the meeting – see Strauss and Corbin. (1998) for more on grounded theory. 
^8	  Such institutional concerns reflect the broader argument in transition about the role of pre-existing institutions. See Stiglitz (1999) of a defense and Dabrowski et al. (2000) for a critique. 
